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Abstract: In this paper, I will deal with an 
aspect of Kant’s conception of our voca-
tion (Bestimmung). I will argue that the way 
Kant conceives of our “higher” vocation, 
namely in terms of a vocation to moral self-
legislation, allows for a religious experience 
of ourselves and in ourselves. In understand-
ing herself in relation to the holiness of her 
pure will, a person might have a religious 
experience of herself, conceiving of her du-
ties as divine commands, whilst also in a 
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W e human beings can deceive ourselves in many ways. For example, we can hide the true reasons for our actions from ourselves; we can avoid seeing what is right before us, 
perhaps because it hurts. Kant knows these phenomena very well. 
However, he also shows that and how we can misunderstand, or not 
clearly comprehend, who we are, thereby neglecting true possibili-
ties of self-realization and a meaningful life. According to Kant, this 
happens when we lead our life as an animal endowed with reason 
—namely, in his terms, as if our sensible self were our whole self.
In Kant’s time, questions of self-understanding and self-real-
ization were discussed under the heading of the ‘vocation (Bestim-
mung) of the human being’.1 In fact, the question of our vocation 
was primarily understood to pertain not to our essence or what we 
are, but to who we should become. Its signiﬁ cance was therefore 
more existential than intellectual. To ask about our vocation was to 
ask why we are here, which is fundamentally to ask about the mean-
ing of our lives.
In this paper, I will deal with an aspect of Kant’s conception of 
our vocation. I will argue that the way he conceives of our ‘higher’ 
vocation, namely in terms of a vocation to moral self-legislation, 
allows for a religious experience of ourselves and in ourselves. The 
expression ‘religious experience’ is notoriously vague; both of its 
central terms are difﬁ cult to deﬁ ne. I will therefore use this term in a 
rather loose way, to denote the experience of something religiously 
signiﬁ cant: an experience that seems to the person having it to have 
religious relevance and to be of something that is objectively real.2 
In the Christian tradition to which Kant belongs, though he ﬁ lters 
its content through the concepts of pure practical reason, the object 
of religious experiences is typically God himself, understood as an 
1. The origin, context, and implications of the vocation question are masterfully 
described by R. BRANDT, Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant (Meiner, Hamburg, 
2007) 8-177. In this paper I deal only with the personal or individual side of 
the question. However, as Brandt highlights, it also has a social side, concerning 
what we might call our collective vocation, as members of mankind, to become 
members of a civil society. 
2. Cf. R. AUDI, Rationality and Religious Commitment (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
2011) 108-109.
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eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, free, and perfectly good being (cf. 
e.g. KU 5:444).3 Since God is no ordinary spatiotemporal object, 
this obviously puts pressure on our common-sense conception of 
experience as a way to acquaint ourselves with ordinary objects and 
some of their properties and relations. However, in speaking of a 
religious experience, I do not refer to the idea of a perceptual expe-
rience of God, although perceptual aspects are involved in religious 
experiences. 
Both versions of the religious experience I have in mind —the 
of- and the in-ourselves versions— are closely connected to the con-
cept of duty that lies at the core of Kant’s ethics. In light of this, I 
will begin by brieﬂ y commenting on a passage from the Critique of 
Practical Reason (1788), in which Kant reﬂ ects on the origin of duty 
in a somewhat emphatic way. The rest of the paper is an attempt to 
unpack a couple of notions appealed to in the passage, the ﬁ rst of 
which is that of the higher vocation of human beings.
ON THE VOCATION OF THE HUMAN BEING TO MORAL 
SELF-DETERMINATION
Kant sees something wonderful and mysterious in duty —in the 
way it asks for submission not by threatening anything that would 
arouse aversion or terror in the mind, but by simply holding forth 
“a law that of itself ﬁ nds entry into the mind and yet gains reluctant 
reverence (though not always obedience)”. This raises the question 
of its origin: “what origin is there worthy of you, and where is to be 
found the root of your noble descent”? Interestingly, in asking this 
question, Kant also suggests that being grounded in this root “is the 
indispensable condition of that worth which human beings alone 
3. Except for the Critique of Pure Reason, which is cited by page numbers in the 
original ﬁ rst (A) and second (B) editions, citations of works by Kant refer to the 
volume and page number in the Academy edition, Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, 
Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften (formerly: Preußische Akademie der 
Wissenschaften), Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1900ff. Translations are taken from 
P. GUYER, A. W. WOOD (eds.), The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel 
Kant (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York, 1992 ff.).
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can give themselves” (KpV 5:86). As he emphasizes, the “root” of 
duty is what elevates a human being “above himself (as a part of the 
sensible world)”, connecting him “with an order of things that only 
the understanding can think”. This order of things, Kant further ex-
plains, “has under it (unter sich) the whole sensible world and with it 
the empirically determinable existence of human beings in time and 
the whole of all ends” (KpV 5:86). He then gives a name to the origin 
of duty: “personality”, that is, in his view, “freedom and independ-
ence from the mechanism of the whole of nature”, but considered 
also “as a capacity of a being subject to special laws —namely pure 
practical laws given by his own reason” (KpV 5:87).
As these passages show, Kant’s conception of the origin of duty 
characterises human beings as belonging to two worlds. He thinks 
that, belonging to the sensible world, human beings are subject to 
their own personality, and they are subject to it because they also 
belong “to the intelligible world”, which is the ground of the sensi-
ble world. For the purposes of this paper, it is not important to enter 
into Kant’s argument. Instead, I point out two lexical choices Kant 
makes in this context. In relation to the human being, he makes use 
of the word “reverence” (Verehrung): “it is then not to be wondered 
at that a human being, as belonging to both worlds, must regard his 
own nature in reference to his second and highest vocation (höchste 
Bestimmung) only with reverence (Verehrung), and its laws with the 
highest respect (Achtung)”. Furthermore, Kant also claims that there 
is something in the human being —he calls it “humanity in his per-
son”— that should be “holy” or inviolable (unverletzlich) “to him” 
(KpV 5:87).
“Reverence” and “holiness” are words that have a religious 
connotation. Is Kant making room for the idea that human beings 
should have a sort of religious attitude toward themselves? Or is he 
hinting at a possible presence of the divine (or of something divine) 
in the human being? A key element in answering these questions 
is the notion of a highest vocation of human beings, articulated in 
an above passage. Kant seems to claim that the object of reverence 
is not human beings per se, but their nature in reference to their 
second and highest vocation. Speaking of a “second” and “highest” 
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vocation of the human being (KpV 5:87) implies a ﬁ rst and somehow 
lower vocation. 
Actually, Kant claims that human beings have two vocations: 
one related to their animal nature (Tierheit) and another related to 
humanity (Menschheit) (cf. Anth-Friedländer 25:682). While our ﬁ rst 
vocation concerns our conservation as individuals and as a species, 
the vocation related to humanity might be interpreted in two ways, 
or better: human beings might interpret their vocation to humanity 
in two ways. This is reﬂ ected in Kant’s use of the term “humanity”. 
In fact, he sometimes uses “humanity” descriptively to express the 
peculiarity of the human being as an animal or a living being en-
dowed with reason; at other times, as in the expression “the human-
ity in his person”, Kant gives a more normative connotation to the 
word and uses it to mean “personality” (in the moral sense). In this 
case, the meaning of “humanity” involves the concepts of freedom 
and self-legislation.4
Taking “humanity” descriptively, we have a ﬁ rst perspective on 
our vocation. Kant speaks of the raising of the human being from 
his animality “toward humanity” as an ascent toward a condition “by 
which he alone is capable of setting himself ends” (MS 6:387). Now, 
the capacity to set oneself an end presupposes conceptual skills and 
an ability to discriminate; it thus depends on the intellect as a faculty 
of concepts and a capacity to form judgments (cf. KU 5:431). Our 
vocation to humanity is strictly connected to the development of 
this kind of rationality, which, it is worth noting, is not restricted 
to the moral sphere: being able to set ends includes the capacity to 
set not only moral but also immoral and morally irrelevant ends. 
Consequently, ‘humanity’ refers to human beings, independently of 
their being good or bad.5 A more substantive sense of ‘rationality’ 
4. On the different meanings of “person” and “personality” in Kant cf. M. BAUM, 
Person und Persönlichkeit bei Kant in A. LOHMAR, H. PEUCKER (eds.), Subjekt 
als Prinzip? Zur Problemgeschichte und Systematik eines neuzeitlichen Paradigmas 
(Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg, 2004) 81-92, and M. BAUM, Subjekt und 
Person bei Kant, in J. CHOTAS, J. KARÁSEK, J. STOLZENBERG (eds.), Metaphysik 
und Kritik. Interpretationen zur “Transzendentalen Dialektik” der Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft (Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg, 2010) 237-251.
5. Cf. J. GLASGOW, Kant’s Conception of Humanity, “Journal of the History of 
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seems also to be involved at this descriptive level, however. For ex-
ample, when Kant points out that as an animal endowed with reason 
(animal rationabile) the human being can make of himself a rational 
animal (animal rationale), he also observes that the human being “has 
a character, which he himself creates, insofar as he is capable of 
perfecting himself according to ends that he himself adopts” (Anthr 
7:321). The use of an expression like “perfecting himself” suggests 
that the ends that one chooses are not insigniﬁ cant to one’s becom-
ing a rational animal. The idea of perfecting oneself seems opposed 
to the adoption of morally reprehensible ends.
I shall attempt to articulate this point further in light of some 
observations in the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), where 
Kant places the human being in the wider context of nature as a 
system of ends. Kant claims that the human being may be consid-
ered the “the ultimate end (der letzte Zweck) of the creation here on 
earth”, and this because he “is the only being on earth who forms a 
concept of ends for himself” (KU 5:426-427). I shall consider here 
neither the subtleties of the teleological context in which this thesis 
is introduced nor Kant’s argument in support of it.6 Rather, I shall 
focus on the feature that he describes as being speciﬁ c to human 
beings, namely their capacity to form a concept of ends for them-
selves. Now, since Kant considers it a characteristic of living beings 
that nothing in them is purposeless (cf. KU 5:376), and since he 
acknowledges that living beings appear to be capable of purposive 
behaviour (cf. KU 5:33, 464), what he clearly wants to point out as 
distinctive of the human being is the capacity for reﬂ exive, purpo-
sive behaviour. In fact, Kant conceives of an end as “the object of a 
concept insofar as the latter is regarded as the cause of the former” 
(KU 5:220). To form a concept of an end for oneself thus implies the 
ability to act in accord with possession of that concept, which means 
to act according to a reason or, in Kant’s conception, to have a will.7 
Philosophy” 45 (2007) 291-308.
6. Cf. on this O. HÖFFE, Der Mensch als Endzweck (§§ 82-84), in O. HÖFFE (ed.), 
Immanuel Kant. Kritik der Urteilskraft (Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 2008) 289-308.
7. Kant calls “will” the faculty of desire, “insofar as it is determinable only through 
concepts”. To have a will is “to act in accordance with the representation of an 
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What Kant views as distinctive of human beings is their capacity to 
reﬂ ect on what they do and to act for reasons.
As we have seen, it is in virtue of this ability that human beings 
might be considered the ultimate end of nature, or so Kant claims. 
However, it is interesting that he points out that such beings can 
occupy the position of the ultimate end only on the condition that 
they have “the understanding and the will” to give to nature and to 
themselves a relation to a ﬁ nal end (Endzeck), that is, to an end “that 
can be sufﬁ cient for itself independently of nature”. An end of this 
sort, Kant states, “must not be sought in nature at all” (KU 5:431), 
because everything in nature possesses a conditioned determining 
ground (cf. KU 5:435). Now, since it is not plausible that we give 
nature itself a relation to an end, presumably what Kant means is 
that we have to give our teleological view or interpretation of na-
ture a relation to a ﬁ nal end, namely, as he further speciﬁ es, to an 
end “which needs no other as the condition of its possibility” (KU 
5:434). Apart from this, Kant must give content to the concept of an 
end sufﬁ cient for itself and must also show that human beings have 
the capacity to set such an end for themselves.
Very brieﬂ y, a Kantian answer to these requests might run as 
follows. The many ends that human beings set themselves might 
ultimately be rooted in their striving for happiness. Happiness is 
“the matter” of all human ends “on earth”; it is “the sum of all 
the ends that are possible through nature outside and inside of 
the human being” (KU 5:431). But happiness, namely (according 
to one deﬁ nition) the “entire well-being and contentment with 
one’s condition” (GMS 4:393), is the end that human beings have 
in accordance with a natural necessity (cf. GMS 4:415).8 It fol-
lows from this that happiness cannot be the ﬁ nal end, and Kant 
consequently points out that making happiness “into his whole 
end” renders the human being “incapable of setting a ﬁ nal end 
end” (KU 5:220).
8. Kant also deﬁ nes happiness as “the greatest sum (in terms of number as well 
as duration) of the agreeableness of life” (KU 5:208). Interestingly, he observes 
that the concept of happiness is not one that the human being derives “from the 
animality in himself” (KU 5: 430).
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for his own existence and of agreeing with that end” (KU 5:431). 
These considerations are clearly connected to the question of the 
vocation of the human being. Why should taking happiness as 
our whole end render us incapable of setting a ﬁ nal end for our 
existence and agreeing with it? 
Kant’s point is presumably that we form the idea of happiness 
“in so many ways and with such frequent changes” (KU 5:430) that 
it cannot represent a point of orientation for the conduct of life.9 In 
his view, happiness is “a mere idea of a state” (KU 5:430), the outline 
of which is contributed to not only by the intellect but also by the 
imagination and the senses. This makes it an “unstable concept” 
(KU 5:430), such that if we take it as our ﬁ nal end, we cannot give 
a uniﬁ ed and consistent form to our lives: our lives will collapse 
into a muddle, reﬂ ecting back to us a confused image of who we are 
with the result that we cannot properly know ourselves. Kant seems 
to suggest that our knowing who we are depends on there being a 
consistent ﬁ nal end of our existence and action. 
Once he has excluded happiness as a ﬁ nal end, understood 
as the sum of the ends that are possible through nature, Kant tries 
to give different content to this notion. He might have reasoned 
along these lines. Human beings have the capacity to set ends for 
themselves and to act accordingly. If they have this capacity, they 
also have the capacity to act independently of alien causes, which, 
according to Kant, is part of what we mean by ‘freedom’. Now, 
if, in choosing their ends, human beings are not subject to law-
like determination by alien causes, they must be subject to the law-
like determination of their own causality, i.e. of their will. Kant is 
thinking of a law that is represented by human beings themselves 
“as unconditioned and independent of natural conditions but yet as 
necessary in itself” (KU 5:435), namely the moral law, which, in his 
view, is the law of freedom. That ﬁ nal end that we cannot ﬁ nd in 
nature, because there is nothing in nature the determining ground 
9. Furthermore, it would be an end that would never be attained by the human 
being, since, or so Kant assumes, “his nature is not of the sort to call a halt 
anywhere in possession and enjoyment and to be satisﬁ ed” (KU 5:430).
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of which is not conditioned, can therefore be found by choosing in 
accordance with the moral law.
Interestingly, this line of thought has the consequence that the 
ﬁ nal end is not a particular object at which to aim, since the moral 
law essentially commands how to will rather than what to will (cf. 
KpV 5:30). Accordingly, the ﬁ nal end turns out to be the human 
being himself as a subject of morality, that is, as a subject of an 
“unconditional legislation with regard to ends” (KU 5:435). As we 
have seen, Kant claims that, in order to be an ultimate end, human 
beings have to give themselves a relation to a ﬁ nal end. If my inter-
pretation is correct, the relation in question is properly a relation 
to themselves: human beings can be the ultimate end of nature only 
if they put themselves in relation to their personality, which, as a 
moral personality, is “nothing other than the freedom of a rational 
being under moral law” (MS 6:223).
I think we can now understand how there might in fact be 
both a “lower” and a “higher” version of Kant’s idea of a vocation 
to humanity as a vocation to self-determination. The “lower” voca-
tion of human beings is to develop the rational capacity of setting 
themselves ends that are all ultimately linked to what is in fact their 
ultimate natural end, namely happiness. By contrast, their “higher” 
vocation is to be moral beings or to live in accordance with an end 
that is not imposed on them by nature and is instead an end of 
freedom.10 We can substantiate this conclusion by considering the 
question of our vocation from the particular point of view of the 
distinctive feature of our nature, that is, rationality. I suggest that we 
might also describe the higher vocation of human beings as a voca-
10. This double vocation is reﬂ ected in what Kant says when he locates the human 
being in nature as a teleological system. On the one hand, he identiﬁ es culture as 
that which is to be promoted within the human being himself as an end through 
his connection to nature —where culture is understood as “the aptitude and skill 
for all sorts of ends for which he can use nature (external and internal)” (KU 
5:430). However, on the other hand, he also claims that we can see that nature 
still displays a purposive attempt to make us receptive “to higher ends” than it 
can afford (KU 5:433). In Kant’s view, nature somehow sets the conditions under 
which the raising of human beings from animality to humanity turns out to be a 
raising above nature itself, according to their “higher” vocation.
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tion to be rational beings rather than merely living beings endowed 
with reason, and that, in Kant’s eyes, a decision to live according to 
our “lower” vocation amounts to a kind of misunderstanding of our 
rational nature.
WAYS OF BEING RATIONAL
Our basic capacity to set ends for ourselves and to act accordingly 
involves the use of reason, a faculty whose main interests, according 
to Kant, are not primarily theoretical (cf. KrV A 797/B 825-A 801/B 
829). He thinks that we do not use reason primarily in relation to 
theoretical aims.11 Therefore, our vocation to self-determination is 
at the same time a question about the vocation of reason as a prac-
tical faculty, i.e. as a faculty that has inﬂ uence on the will. What, 
exactly, is reason for?
One possibility is that we have the rational capacity to set ends, 
to use the means to these ends, and to organize them into the whole 
that we call “happiness”: namely, that we have reason in order to 
realize the end that we have by natural necessity (cf. GMS 4:415; 
cf. also KrV A 800/B828; KpV 5:25). However, in Kant’s eyes —at 
least in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785)12— rea-
11. On this Kantian belief cf. R. BRANDT, Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant 
(Meiner, Hamburg, 2007) 22-37. A nice version of the idea might be found in 
KU § 86. Reﬂ ecting on the value of the world, Kant states that it is not in relation 
to the cognitive faculty (theoretical reason) of human beings that “the existence 
of everything else in the world ﬁ rst acquires its value, so that someone should 
exist who can consider the world”. Rather, it is in relation to the faculty of desire 
that the world acquires its value, “although not that which makes” human beings 
“dependent on nature (through sensible impulses)”, not that in regard to which 
the value of their existence rests on what they receive and enjoy. Kant claims that 
it is the value that they alone can give to themselves, and which consists in what 
they do, “in how and in accordance with which principles” they act, not as a link in 
nature but in the exercise of the freedom of their faculty of desire; i.e. “a good will 
is that alone by means of which” their existence “can have an absolute value and in 
relation to which the existence of the world can have a ﬁ nal end” (KU 5:443). 
12. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant somewhat more positively acknowledges 
the role of reason in forming action-guiding rules with regard to happiness. As 
belonging to the sensible world, “the human being is a being with needs”, and to 
this extent “his reason certainly has a commission from the side of his sensibility 
which he cannot refuse” (KpV 5:61). 
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son’s performance in the service of happiness is rather poor. Pre-
sumably, to support the idea of reason’s having a different vocation, 
Kant underestimates reason’s ability to help us to survive and pro-
mote our well-being. In fact, given the background assumption of 
a purposiveness of nature “in distributing its capacities (Anlagen)”, 
emphasizing the faults of reason with regard to our desire for hap-
piness allows Kant to argue that the “true vocation” of reason as a 
practical faculty is not to guide the will in regard to the satisfaction 
of the needs that we connect to happiness. Rather, its vocation must 
be that in relation to which reason is “absolutely necessary”, namely 
the achievement of a will that is “good in itself” (GMS 4:396). But if 
reason is entrusted to human beings with the task of producing a 
good will, then their vocation to become rational beings is a voca-
tion to produce a good will and to live in accordance with it.
Of the concept of a will that is good in itself, Kant claims that 
it is contained for us in the concept of duty (cf. GMS 4:397), or of 
the necessity of an action from respect for the moral law (GMS 
4:400), which is a law of reason itself. Our vocation to become 
rational beings may thus be interpreted as a vocation to moral self-
legislation, or to put pure reason to practical use, determining by 
it “what to do, and thereby forming the intention to do it”.13 For 
Kant, this is not merely a conceptual question. Rather, in shedding 
light on our higher vocation as a vocation to moral self-determi-
nation, he at the same time leads us to a different understanding 
of ourselves.
Supersensible existence
There might be more than a hint of idealization in Kant’s discourse 
on the “true” vocation of reason and the connected “higher” voca-
tion of human beings. However, why he thinks that the acknowledg-
ment of such a vocation brings with it a completely different form 
of self-understanding is made clear in a comment on the incentive 
13. A. W. MOORE, Noble in Reason, Inﬁ nite in Faculty. Themes and Variations in Kant’s 
Moral and Religious Philosophy (Routledge, London-New York, 2003) 27.
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(Triebfeder) of pure practical reason. The comment follows the claim 
that this incentive is nothing other than the moral law itself. Having 
stated this, Kant emphasizes that the moral law has this role
[…] insofar as it lets us discover the sublimity of our super-
sensible existence and subjectively effects respect (Achtung) for 
their higher vocation in human beings, who are at the same 
time conscious of their sensible existence and of the depend-
ence, connected with it, on their pathologically affected nature 
(KpV 5:88).
This evocative passage suggests that moral motivation comes along 
with an insight into a feature of our supersensible existence that 
Kant qualiﬁ es as its sublimity; furthermore, the passage suggests 
that the moral law opens up a particular self-experience in term of 
a feeling of respect for ourselves as moral persons. What sense can 
we make of Kant’s notion of the supersensible existence of human 
beings, and of its sublimity?
As a ﬁ rst step, we should consider that as rational living be-
ings we have the capacity to set ourselves ends; this capacity allows 
us to direct our own lives rather then merely responding to the 
needs or ends imposed on us by nature. On this basis, Kant makes 
a stronger point. He claims that the moral law reveals to us “a life 
independent of animality and even of the whole sensible world” 
(KpV 5:161). Therefore, in a basic sense, a supersensible existence 
is an existence independent of the sensible world, at least insofar as 
its determination or the determination of how to live is based on 
moral reﬂ ection. A supersensible existence is nothing other than our 
sensible existence as viewed from the standpoint of the intelligible 
self-consciousness of the rational being.14
14. According to Kant, the moral law “is to furnish the sensible world, as a sensible 
nature (in what concerns rational beings), with the form of a world of the 
understanding, that is, of a supersensible nature, though without infringing upon 
the mechanism of the former” (KpV 5:43). As for this latter clause, its justiﬁ cation 
presents huge difﬁ culties. Cf. R. HANNA, A. W. MOORE, Reason, Freedom and Kant: 
An Exchange, “Kantian Review” 12 (2007) 113-133, and M. WOLFF, Kant über 
Freiheit und Determinismus, in W. EULER, B.TUSCHLING (eds.), Kants “Metaphysik 
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In the passage quoted above, Kant hints at the idea of the sub-
limity of an existence independent of the sensible world. This sub-
limity has a lot to do with the deﬁ ning character of a supersensible 
existence. This kind of existence is grounded on human beings’ use 
of reason in the service of more than the satisfaction of their needs. 
Kant claims that the human being is not “so completely an animal 
as to be indifferent to all that reason says on its own”, and that he 
has reason also “for a higher purpose”, namely to reﬂ ect on what 
is good or evil in itself, to distinguish it from the appraisal of what 
contributes to his well-being, and “to make it the supreme condi-
tion” of the latter (KpV 5:62). Now, to subordinate appraisal of what 
contributes to well-being to reﬂ ection on what is good or evil in 
itself implies a willingness to subordinate the goods that are related 
to happiness to the condition of agreement with the moral law. In 
some cases, this might mean sacriﬁ cing those goods (cf. KpV 5:76). 
The sublimity Kant has in mind is connected to this willingness 
to subordinate or sacriﬁ ce the subjective determining grounds of 
choice to the objective grounds of morality; however, there is sub-
limity in this submission only insofar as it reveals the real sublimity 
that Kant recognises in the fact that the person who is subject to the 
moral law is “at the same time lawgiving with respect to it and only 
for that reason subordinated to it” (GMS 4:440).15
Kant views the experience of being bound by a law imposed 
by our own reason fundamentally as an experience of independence 
from all sensible limitations, of elevation above them and transcend-
der Sitten” in der Diskussion. Ein Arbeitsgespräch an der Herzog August Bibliothek 
Wolfenbüttel 2009, (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2013) 27-42.
15. “There is something in us”, Kant writes in The Conﬂ ict of the Faculties (1798), 
“that we cannot cease to wonder at when we have once seen it, the same thing 
that raises humanity in its idea to a dignity we should never have suspected in the 
human being as an object of experience.” He then speciﬁ es that what we wonder 
at is “our ability so to sacriﬁ ce our sensuous nature to morality that we can do 
what we quite readily and clearly conceive we ought to do. This ascendancy of 
the supersensible human being in us over the sensible, such that (when it comes 
to a conﬂ ict between them) the sensible is nothing, though in its own eyes it 
is everything, is an object of the greatest wonder; and our wonder at this moral 
predisposition in us, inseparable from our humanity, only increase the longer we 
contemplate this true (not fabricated) ideal” (7:58).
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ence of what is connected to sensibility. He uses the word ‘sublim-
ity’ precisely to qualify the form that existence may take in virtue 
of our possessing —or rather grasping in an engaged way— the 
concept of duty.16
I shall summarize and add some further considerations before 
moving on to the core of my reﬂ ections on the religious charac-
ter that a certain experience of ourselves might have. Moving from 
Kant’s claim that human beings must regard their own nature and 
their higher vocation “only with reverence (Verehrung)”, I have tried 
to clarify the object of this attitude and to unpack Kant’s idea of 
a highest vocation of human beings. As we have seen, this higher 
vocation is a vocation to moral self-determination. It corresponds 
to the vocation of reason to produce a good will. Since the concept 
of a good will is for us that of duty, the higher vocation of human 
beings turns out to be a vocation to conduct their lives in accordance 
with the concept of duty. Just why we should regard the nature of 
human beings in reference to this vocation with reverence becomes 
clear when we consider that this orienting of one’s life to duty dis-
closes a supersensible aspect of that nature, namely its pure rational 
character.
We might corroborate this last claim by recalling some con-
siderations by Adrian Moore on concept possession. Moore points 
out that to possess a concept is to make sense of things in a certain 
way; it is “to enter into the spirit of that concept, to have whatever 
outlook gives the concept its point, to live by the concept”.17 Pos-
session of a concept is a kind of knowledge. It is not knowledge that 
anything is the case; rather, it is knowledge of how to do certain 
16. This experience of transcendence has an aesthetic counterpart in the feeling 
of the sublime that Kant interprets as ultimately a feeling of respect “for our 
own vocation” (KU 5:257) and therefore as a self-experience of human beings as 
moral subjects who can resist and overcome their natural needs and interests. As 
Kant points out, while “the beautiful prepares us to love something, even nature, 
without interest”, the sublime prepares us “to esteem it, even contrary to our 
(sensible) interest” (KU 5:267).
17. Cfr. A. W. MOORE, op. cit, 49. For a fascinating and sophisticated discussion of 
concept possession cf. 48-89.
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things.18 In the Kantian case of the concept of duty, to possess it, 
that is, to think and to act in keeping with it, is to live in a space of 
reasons for action beyond “subjective ends” —namely the ends that 
we set for ourselves on the basis of personal needs and inclinations. 
It is to live in the space of objective ends, or ends that hold “for 
every rational being” (GMS 4:427-428). In virtue of this, the pos-
session of the concept of duty also gives us the outlook of a form of 
life in a mundus intelligibilis, or a world of rational beings (cf. GMS 
4:438): to think and to act on the basis of that concept is to assume a 
standpoint on one’s life that is the standpoint of pure practical rea-
son. Although we view or count ourselves as member of two worlds, 
that is, of the sensible world and the intelligible world, as rational 
beings we belong to the latter,19 which also means that we belong 
to a kingdom of ends, or “a systematic union” of rational beings as 
ends in themselves and of the ends of one’s own “that each may set 
himself” (cf. GMS 4:433). And this is because, in Kant’s view, when 
we regard ourselves as subject to the demands of pure practical rea-
son, we also regard ourselves as free (cf. KpV 5:4 n.) and autonomous 
beings, who should never be treated as mere means but always at the 
same time as ends in themselves.
This perspective makes sense of Kant’s claim that there is 
something in human beings that should be treated as “holy” or in-
violable (KpV 5:87). However, if we take a closer look at this “some-
thing”, which he calls “humanity” in one’s person, we might be a 
bit bewildered. Kant equates living in accordance with the concept 
of duty with living in accordance with one’s autonomy and being 
one’s “proper self (das eigentliches Selbst)” (GMS 4:457).20 The double 
standpoint from which we can consider ourselves corresponds to the 
possibility of two modes of self-consciousness (cf. GMS 4:453, 458), 
one of which is of our proper self. Oddly enough, this self does not 
18. Cf. A. W. MOORE, op. cit, 73.
19. It is worth recalling that Kant sees the intelligible world as a supersensible nature, 
namely as a nature (a whole in accordance with laws) not given empirically, and 
also as an object “of our will as pure rational beings” (KpV 5:44).
20. He then suggests that, “as a human being”, a person is only “the appearance of 
himself” (GMS 4:457).
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seem to be one’s own in the sense of one’s individual or particular 
self. My proper self does not individuate me; in fact, it achieves the 
contrary. In another passage, Kant seems to identify our “proper 
self” with our “will as intelligence” (GMS 4:461), that is, with our 
will as members of the intelligible world. Now, our supersensible 
nature as rational beings is our existence in accordance with the 
moral law (cf. KpV 5:43), which is a supra-individual principle hold-
ing “for the will of every rational being” (KpV 5:19). This means 
that one’s will as intelligence, one’s proper self, is determined by the 
same law. These selves are therefore qualitatively identical: they are 
the humanity in our person.21
Since being one’s proper self is living in keeping with the con-
cept of duty, being (or becoming) one’s proper self coincides with 
realizing one’s higher vocation. ‘Proper self’ is presumably an ex-
pression that refers to the nature of human beings in reference to 
their highest vocation —that nature which, Kant claims, must be an 
object of reverence for them, as something divine. We encounter 
a similar result when we consider what Kant views as holy in us 
(cf. KpV 5:87). On the one hand, Kant claims that what is holy is 
so because of its relation to that “which is holy in itself, and on ac-
count of which and in agreement with which alone can anything be 
termed holy” (KpV 5: 131-132), namely the moral law.22 However, 
on the other hand, Kant also maintains that the moral law is called 
‘holy’ because it “constantly and rightly” holds before the eyes of 
the human being the practical idea of a will incapable of any maxim 
“that could not at the same time be objectively a law” (KpV 5:32), 
that is, the practical idea of a holy will (cf. GMS 4:414). Now, since 
‘proper self’, ‘invisible self’, ‘personality’ (KpV 5:162), and ‘pure will’ 
seem to be interchangeable terms, they all refer to what for Kant is 
the ‘holy in us’, but this is nothing other than what makes us capable 
21. Since they are not in space and time, one could argue, with Schwarz, that they 
are also numerically identical. Cf. G. SCHWARZ, Est Deus in nobis. Die Identität 
von Gott und reiner praktischer Vernunft in Immanuel Kants “Kritik der praktischen 
Vernunft” (Verlag TU Berlin, Berlin, 2004).
22. For a comment cf. R. THEIS, Respect de la loi, respect de la personne: Kant, “Revue 
Philosophique de Louvain” 103 (2005) 331-346.
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of self-legislation: our pure practical reason. It is tempting to infer 
that pure practical reason is something divine in us. This is a conclu-
sion that Kant himself seems to draw; however, his words also allow 
for other interpretations.
PURE PRACTICAL REASON, THE HOLY IN US AND THE GOD IN US 
There is an intriguing aspect of Kant’s conception. Suppose I am 
not wrong, and Kant did in fact think along these lines: our proper 
self is a pure will, and since a pure will is a holy will, there is some-
thing holy in us. Now, ‘holy’ is a qualiﬁ cation usually attributed to 
the divine will. Given that there is something holy in us insofar as 
we are the subjects of the moral law, namely both lawgiving and 
subordinated to that law, it seems to follow that, at least insofar as 
we possess pure reason, we partake of the divine. Although Kant 
does not think that we are purely rational, he nevertheless might 
have thought that there literally is something divine in us, that our 
(possible) partaking of the divine is connected to our sharing in pure 
practical reason, in virtue of which we are subjects of the moral law 
and our proper self. This line of thought seems to be corroborated 
by Kant’s reference to pure practical reason as the “God in us” (cf. 
Op. Post. 22:130). However, the point is slippery. Should we take 
Kant’s words literally? Does he really think that practical reason is 
God or, somehow more plausibly, that pure practical reason “in its 
personality” (Op. Post. 22:118) is the idea of God? How should we 
read the claim that God is moral, practical, lawgiving reason itself 
(cf. Op. Post. 21:145)?23
One might also doubt whether these questions make sense. 
On the one hand, one might read Kant’s statements metaphorically: 
23. To answer these questions properly, one would obviously have to consider how 
Kant, after his retirement in 1796, changed his view on whether rational reﬂ ection 
on the authority of the moral law should lead ﬁ nite rational agents to believe in 
God’s existence. I inevitably leave all this in the background. For discussion of 
the Opus Postumum, see E. FÖRSTER, Kant’s Final Synthesis. An Essay on the Opus 
postumum, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA-London, 2000), and G. 
P. BASILE, Kants Opus postumum und seine Rezeption (Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte 
175, De Gruyter, Berlin, 2013) (on the reception of Kant’s ﬁ nal, unﬁ nished work).
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ascribing a divine nature to reason might well be a way of empha-
sising its superiority over our subjective ends.24 On the other hand, 
whether we partake of the divine is debatable. Maybe the claim that 
there is something holy in us does not imply that holiness is a prop-
erty we possess. After all, Kant maintains that holiness as complete 
conformity of the will with the moral law is a perfection “of which 
no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of 
his existence” (KpV 5:122). According to him, we lack that perfec-
tion, and all the moral perfection we can attain “is still only virtue” 
(KpV 5:128). However, he also acknowledges that a capacity to value 
pure practical rationality is part of our vocation; therefore, even if, 
as rational beings of the sensible world, we lack holiness, holiness 
is possible for us “in idea” (GMS 4:440), just as the production of 
a pure will is possible for us “in idea”.25 Though we are not holy, 
keeping faith in the idea of holiness in the course of our lives is, for 
Kant, a part of our (higher) vocation.26
This view is supported by a line of thought developed by Kant 
in his Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793). At a cer-
tain point in the text, he rephrases the ideal of holiness or of “Hu-
manity (rational being in general as pertaining to the world) in its full 
moral perfection” in Christological terms, and of the morally perfect 
human being he says, quoting the Gospel of St. John (cf. 1:1-2), that 
he is in God “from all eternity”, such that “the idea of him proceeds 
24. Cf. Op. post. 22:51-52: “The categorical imperative represents all human duties 
as divine commands; not historically, as if [God] had ever issued certain orders to 
man, but as reason [presents] them through the supreme power of the categorical 
imperative, in the same manner as a divine person can rigorously command 
submission to himself.”
25. In a passage of the Op. Post. 21:30 that unfortunately breaks off, Kant notes: “‘we 
are originally of divine race’ with regard to our vocation and its dispositions”, 
quoting a line by Aratus recalled in The Acts of the Apostles 17:28.
26. This interpretation requires that Kant’s claim that, in the case of human beings as 
rational beings “one can presuppose a pure will” (KpV 5:32) should be understood 
as meaning not that they possess a pure will, but that they have to realize it 
(acting under its idea, which they actually possess). This reading seems also to be 
suggested by Kant’s statement that holiness of will is “a practical idea, which must 
necessarily serve as a model to which all ﬁ nite rational beings can only approximate 
without end” (KpV 5:32), thereby showing that a demand for holiness can be 
addressed to them.
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from God’s being” (RGV 6:60). Leaving aside the theological and 
hermeneutical problems connected to an interpretation of the ﬁ gure 
of Christ in terms of the ideal of moral perfection, namely as “the 
representation of an individual being as adequate to an idea” (KU 
5:232), I simply note here that Kant considers it “our universal duty 
to elevate ourselves to this ideal (Ideal), i.e. to the prototype (Urbilde) 
of moral disposition in its entire purity”; in fulﬁ lling this duty, the 
“very idea” of moral perfection “which is presented to us by reason 
for emulation (von der Vernunft uns zur Nachstrebung vorgelegt wird), 
can give as force” (RGV 6:61). That idea, Kant states, “resides in our 
morally-legislative reason”, and since “we ought to conform to it […] 
we must be able to” (RGV 6:62).27
Holiness, or moral perfection, is a possible end for rational be-
ings, and as an idea it has practical reality; namely, it can and ought 
to have inﬂ uence on the will of such beings. They should represent 
the “God-like human being” (RGV 6:61) as a model of humanity for 
themselves and follow it. This perspective helps to make sense of the 
claim that rational beings, at least with regard to their higher voca-
tion, are somehow divine. A human being who acts in accord with 
a pure will, i.e. a holy will, follows the ideal of the God-like human 
being. Similarity is not identity, but this does not prevent us from 
saying of such a being that, at least in the determination of the will, 
she transcends her ﬁ niteness and becomes in a sense divine. Suppos-
ing that this makes some sense, we must face the more slippery as-
pect of Kant’s view and attempt to interpret the “God in us” claim.
In a note belonging to the preparatory works for the Religion, 
Kant describes the idea of holiness as “this God in us” (AA 23:108). 
As we have just seen, the idea of holiness is an idea that resides in 
our reason; if it is a God in us, then God resides in our reason. Of 
note with regard to this is an intriguing parallelism in Kant’s text: 
as the human being in his full moral perfection is said, quoting St. 
John, to be in God from all eternity, so the idea of a pure moral 
intention is said to be in our morally-legislative reason. Now, the 
27. On this cf. L. PASTERNACK, Kant on Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 
(Routledge, London-New York, 2014) 133-141.
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morally perfect human being is an instance of that idea; therefore, 
it is tempting to consider pure practical reason itself as the God 
in whom the idea of moral perfection lies. Is pure practical reason 
ultimately the God in us, or is this just a way of expressing its un-
conditioned normative character?
It may be useful to look at this question from a slightly different 
point of view, namely in light of one way in which Kant expresses 
his conception of the double nature of the human being. Here I 
refer to his distinction between homo phaenomenon and homo noume-
non. The former expression refers to the human being as a sensible 
being, the latter to her existence as pure intelligence and as a being 
independent of sensible determinations and therefore free (cf. MS 
6:239).28 While these expressions might also have an ontological 
connotation, it seems reasonable to interpret them as marking a 
difference of aspects: these two homines cannot but be one and the 
same human being. Now, for Kant, ignoring the noumenal aspect of 
ourselves, or the possible holiness and God-likeness of the rational 
being, equates to a deep self-misunderstanding. We might suffer 
from such a misunderstanding because our “pathologically deter-
minable self” tries to make its claims “primary and originally valid, 
just as if it constituted our entire self” (KpV 5:74; cf. also Fakultäten 
7:58). Interestingly, an immediate consequence of such unilateral 
self-comprehension is that we consider homo noumenon as differ-
ent from us and not as an aspect of ourselves, even though it is the 
reference point of our higher vocation, the ideal of how the human 
being, according to reason, should and can be (cf. MS-Vigilantius 
27:593). To fail to view the homo noumenon as an aspect of ourselves, 
as the subjective principle of legislation in the human being and thus 
indeed as our proper self, is to misunderstand ourselves.
However, there is another respect in which a sense of other-
ness with regard to homo noumenon seems justiﬁ ed. After all, under 
this aspect the human being is a supersensible being, and therefore, 
28. The distinction corresponds to that between “human being” and “humanity” in 
the Groundwork, and to that between “person” and “personality” in the Critique of 
Practical Reason.
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strictly speaking, unknowable. We thus encounter a question raised 
in a passage in Metaphysik K3 with regard to moral self-legislation: 
we do not know whether there is a productive being in us that rep-
resents the law to us as an effect, or whether we ourselves possess 
this productive faculty —“We cannot explain what is working in us. 
Nevertheless its effects over sensible nature are astonishing” (Met-
K3 29:1023).29 In The Conﬂ ict of the Faculties, speaking of the inner 
supersensible principle by which the human being is determined 
to act, namely the representation of his duty, Kant maintains that 
“since we want to explain this principle, although we know no fur-
ther ground for it, we represent it as a stimulus to good produced in 
us by God” (Fakultäten 7:43). He then writes that, “since the super-
sensible in us is inconceivable and yet practical, we can well excuse 
those who are led to consider it supernatural —that is, to regard it 
as the inﬂ uence of another and higher spirit, something not within 
our power and not belonging to us as our own” (Fakultäten 7:59).
If a practical misunderstanding of ourselves according to which 
homo phaenomenon is our whole self might lead us to neglect the 
supersensible in us, the incomprehensibility of this latter aspect of 
ourselves might lead us to consider it supernatural, as ‘other’ or 
‘above us’, which is also a kind of misunderstanding. In fact, this 
shifting of the supersensible to a position ‘above us’ amounts to not 
having a clear image of our own nature and moral vocation, since 
homo noumenon, while different from the human being as a sensible 
being, is, at least from a practical point of view, identical with him: 
as Kant in one occasion states, it is “the moral practical reason in 
us” that gives us laws (AA 23:398; cf. also MS 6:335).30 Kant might 
use the expression “God in us” to qualify moral practical reason or 
homo noumenon as the source and place of the idea of holiness, and, 
in this sense, as our divine aspect.
To consider the morally-legislative reason in us as holy is to 
ascribe to it a divine property, and to the extent that we understand 
ourselves in relation to the moral law and its source within us, we 
29. I owe the reference to this passage to G. SCHWARZ, Est Deus in nobis cit., 253.
30. Quoted in G. SCHWARZ, Ibidem, 262.
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might be said to have an experience of holiness in ourselves, or a 
kind of religious experience of ourselves. Obviously, as I have al-
ready noted, ascribing a divine property to reason might be a way to 
emphasize the superiority of its incentive relative to our subjective 
ends. However, this is not an objection to my reading, since the ex-
perience I am speaking of is identical to what Kant describes as the 
discovery of the sublimity of our supersensible existence, and since, 
as we have seen, we discover the sublimity of our existence in our 
experience of the overridingness of our own pure practical reason. 
More difﬁ cult, however, is the question whether Kant, in addition 
to the possibility of a religious experience of ourselves, also makes 
room for a religious experience in ourselves —namely whether he 
allows for the possibility that we not only consider our moral prac-
tical reason as divine but also somehow experience the divine in it.
A rather obvious way to support this possibility seems to be 
Kant’s view of religion as “the recognition of our duties as divine 
commands” (KU 5:481; cf. also KpV 5:129). Religion, Kant claims, 
is “morals in relation to God as legislator” (KU 5:460).31 I cannot go 
into the details of this thesis here.32 Rather, I shall simply note that 
Kant might have had good reason to conceive of a consideration of 
our duties as divine commands. For one thing, although we have 
insight into their necessity, we also ﬁ nd it difﬁ cult to explain this 
necessity: “we cannot very well make obligation (moral constraint) 
intuitive for ourselves without thereby thinking of another’s will, 
namely God’s (of which reason in giving universal laws is only the 
spokesman)” (MS 6:487). Furthermore, we are not purely rational. 
Sometimes we are at variance with the laws of reason, and religion 
helps us to come to terms with this fact —a fact that, in light of 
Kant’s conception of the vocation of human beings, might be inter-
31. Cf. also MS 6:440, where Kant states that, in the doctrine of virtue, the concept of 
religion is only “a principle of estimating all our duties as divine commands”. As 
Förster notes, this modal ‘as’ will later turn out to be an ‘as if’. See E. FÖRSTER, 
Kant’s Final Synthesis cit.,143.
32. For interpretation cf. J. E. HARE, Kant on Recognizing our Duties as Divine 
Commands, “Faith and Philosophy” 17 (2000) 459-478, and above all P. KAIN, 
Interpreting Kant’s Theory of Divine Commands, “Kantian Review” 9 (2005) 128-
149.
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preted as their irrational propensity not to (properly) be who they 
are or to neglect their supersensible being, their proper self.
However, Kant emphasizes that in considering our duties as 
divine commands we are expressing only “the relation of reason 
to the idea of God” which it makes for itself, and not to any being 
external to this idea (MS 6:487).33 He thereby seems to suggest that 
“God” refers not to any knowable entity, but to an idea that must 
necessarily be thought of in relation to moral action. God, Kant 
states in the Opus Postumum, in line with the more thoroughgoing 
idealism he was trying to develop, is not an object of experience but 
rather an idea (cf. Op. Post. 21:144). In light of this, one might doubt 
the correctness of describing the recognition of one’s own duties as 
divine commands in terms of a religious experience. This doubt ac-
tually corresponds to Kant’s own take on the matter. In The Conﬂ ict 
of the Faculties, Kant describes the example of a person who, having 
“experienced a change in himself” (in the sense of having new and 
better volitions) “which he does not know how to explain”, traces 
his experience back to divine inﬂ uence. Kant speaks against this kind 
of attribution, however; for him, “[t]o claim that we feel as such the 
immediate inﬂ uence of God is self-contradictory, because the idea 
of God lies only in reason” (7:58). An objection along these lines 
might be made to someone who claims to experience her duties as 
divine commands.
My answer to this doubt, which ultimately concerns the in-
dependent existence of God, is simply that it does not necessarily 
exclude the religious character of the experience in question, if we 
take ‘religious experience’ to mean experience of something reli-
giously signiﬁ cant. To view human duties “as if [they were] divine 
commands and in relation to a person”, from which it would follow 
33. Cf. also Op. Post. 22:122: “A universal, morally law-giving being, which, thus, has 
all power, is God. There exists a God, that is, one principle which, as substance, 
is morally law-giving”. However, Kant adds that “it is not a substance outside 
myself, whose existence I postulate as a hypothetical being for the explanation of 
certain phenomena in the world”. Actually, he seems to view the concept of duty 
as “contained identically in the concept of a divine being as an ideal” that human 
reason frames for the sake of its law-giving (Op. Post. 22:123). 
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that “there is God in the soul of man” is a religiously signiﬁ cant ex-
perience, even if we cannot thereby “certify the existence of such a 
being: For the supersensible is not an object of possible experience” 
(Op. post. 22:120).34 However, I wish also to point out that if Kant 
refers to the idea of God in the passage just quoted, and therefore to 
a thought-entity or a subjective form, he also recognizes that reason 
as a practical faculty is somehow led to consider God as a being that 
exists outside of and independently of the subject. A striking exam-
ple of this line of thinking in Kant is the following passage from the 
Opus Postumum: “A command, to which everyone must absolutely 
give obedience, is to be regarded by everyone as from a being which 
rules and governs over all. Such a being, as moral, however, is called 
God. So there is a God” (Op. Post. 22:127).35 From the point of view 
34. Kant also notes that the divine being “requires no proof of its existence, as if it 
were a natural being; its existence already lies, rather, in the developed concept of 
this idea, according to the principle of identity: The mere form here counts to the 
being of the thing” (Op. Post. 21:92).
35. See E. FÖRSTER, Kant’s Final Synthesis cit., 171-172 for a comment on this 
passage. The subtleties (and intricacies) of Kant’s position are also evident in his 
discussion of conscience. He claims that the concept of God as a moral being that 
has the power to give effect to his laws “is always contained (even if only in an 
obscure way) in the moral self-awareness of conscience”. However, he maintains 
that this does not mean that we are “entitled”, through the idea to which our 
conscience “unavoidably” guides us, “to assume that such a supreme being actually 
exists” outside ourselves (MS 6:439). The idea of God is not given to us “objectively, 
by theoretical reason”, namely it is not a content of knowledge; rather, it is given 
to us “only subjectively, by practical reason, putting itself under obligation to 
act in keeping with this idea” (MS 6:639-640). Kant shifts between identifying 
God with our pure practical reason —a perspective that he repeatedly appeals 
to in the last phase of his thought (cf. Op. Post. 21:25-26 and 145)— and the 
idea of a (practical) commitment to his independent existence. Let us consider, 
for example, his claim that, through using practical reason, human beings are 
led to think of conscientiousness —which, he recalls, is also named religio— “as 
accountability to a holy being (morally lawgiving reason) distinct from us yet 
present in our inmost being” (MS 6:440). As nuanced as this position might be, it 
is barely tenable. How can our morally lawgiving reason really be distinct from us 
if it is our proper self? And, if it is not, can Kant really be satisﬁ ed with a relation 
to a subjectively-given idea (of God)? Maybe there is a problem here. Laws 
should not only be promulgated, but also enforced (or enforceable), which here 
refers to the wielding of sanctions against law-breakers. But one cannot punish 
oneself for breaking the laws one gives oneself. Self-punishment is a contradiction 
(cf. MS 6:485). Of course, we can feel guilty; but is guilt a sanction, given that 
it is not deliberately imposed (on us) as sanctions are? The strategy of dividing 
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of a genuine assertion of existence, respect for the law or conscious-
ness of one’s duty (cf. MS 6:464) could be a religious experience 
of God as an independent being. This is not to say that people, in 
conceiving their own duties as divine commands, somehow perceive 
God’s act of commanding. Presumably, the sense of being com-
manded by God relates to the way one feels in being obliged to 
obey a moral rule. The perceptual element described above (the 
perception of an act of command) does not seem essential to this 
experience, at least if what is really at stake is the effect of being com-
manded.36 Provided one has a concept of God, one may “hear” the 
(metaphorical) voice of reason as the (metaphorical) voice of God. 
The tricky point is then to show how the experience can reveal that 
it is God who commands. How can one rationally believe that it is 
God who commands a duty? Maintaining his conviction that moral-
ity (possibly) leads to religion and not the other way round, Kant’s 
answer is that we regard certain moral rules as divine commands 
“because we are internally obligated to them” (KrV A819/B847).
With this standard in place, Kant might well allow that the 
moral feeling can be expanded (or deepened) into a religious experi-
ence. In understanding herself in relation to the holiness of her pure 
will, a person might have a religious experience of herself, conceiving 
of her duties as divine commands, whilst also in a sense experiencing 
God in herself —in her personality. I will conclude these reﬂ ections 
with a couple of remarks on moral autonomy and divine commands.
CONCLUDING REMARKs
In this paper, we have seen that Kant conceives of the vocation of 
human beings in terms of (moral) self-legislation. I have argued that 
the self into parts or aspects and arguing that the rational self has power over the 
sensible self, such that it can limit its claims, restrain it, and legislate over it, might 
appear to be a mere metaphor, since it is not actual different selves that recreate 
the relation between subjects. Kant is well aware of the problem: “We cannot very 
well make obligation (moral constraint) intuitive for ourselves without thereby 
thinking of another’s will, namely God’s” (MS 6:487).
36. Here I have modiﬁ ed an example by R. AUDI, Rationality cit., 109.
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in conceiving of our vocation in this way, Kant makes room for the 
idea of something holy in us, or of a God in us. Though this might 
only be a way of representing our pure practical reason and its law 
to ourselves, nothing prevents us from taking Kant’s words literally. 
Both interpretations are possible; namely, we can suppose that Kant 
views pure practical reason (or its law) as God in us, but we can also 
read him as suggesting that we might have a kind of experience of 
God to the degree that we experience the commands of pure practi-
cal reason as His commands. If we read Kant this way, conceiving 
our duties as divine commands might involve a relational religious 
experience of God (as legislator). Whether this experience is really 
of something divine or as of something divine might in the end be 
left unanswered, however. Either conception is possible, and Kant 
leaves room for both interpretations.
Is the conception of our duties as divine commands in the 
stronger, literal (and not merely metaphorical) sense compatible 
with moral autonomy? I think it is, because the duties that we rec-
ognise as divine commands are precisely those that pure practical 
reason autonomously imposes on us as rational beings. To conceive 
of them as divine commands is not to relinquish moral autonomy, 
since to conceive of their obligating force as deriving from God’s 
will is to conceive of it as deriving from a supremely rational being 
who wills “what all rational beings will”.37 One can conceive of du-
ties in this way and still hold fast to the Kantian claim that our abil-
ity to recognize our duties and to act accordingly depends neither 
on the idea “of another being above” human beings nor on an incen-
tive beyond the moral law itself (RGV 6:3). We arrive at the same 
conclusion even if we subscribe to a stronger version of the divine 
command view, according to which what is obligatory is such be-
cause God commands it (cf. Op. Post. 22:127). God’s commands are 
not arbitrary. Indeed, it is part of the Kantian concept of God that 
He is a moral legislator; therefore, what He commands reﬂ ects what 
a pure will wants.38 While the property of being a duty might be 
37. A. W. MOORE, Noble in Reason, Inﬁ nite in Faculty cit., 149-150.
38. “Religion is the recognition of all duties as divine commands, not as sanctions, 
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conceived as identical with that of being commanded by God, con-
ceiving a duty as a divine command does not turn the concept of the 
obligatory into a theological concept. One can know that something 
is a duty without conceiving it as a divine command. Kant’s view is 
that a type of action is divinely commanded on the same grounds 
that make it a duty for us. Moral autonomy is therefore compatible 
with experiencing a duty as a divine command. This religious expe-
rience in ourselves in truth involves a deepened religious experience 
of ourselves.
i.e., arbitrary and contingent ordinances of a foreign will, but as essential laws of 
any free will as such” (KpV 5:129).
